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569 
UDHR: OUR NORTH STAR FOR GLOBAL 
SOCIAL JUSTICE OR AN IMPERIAL AND 
SETTLER-COLONIAL TOOL TO LIMIT OUR 
CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM? 
Jeena Shah* 
bell hooks describes freedom “as positive social equality that 
grants all humans the opportunity to shape their destinies in the most 
healthy and communally productive way.”1  This is the kind of 
freedom that oppressed communities are fighting for around the 
world: in struggles to create ecosystems of community safety and 
accountability without policing or prisons;2  systems and practices 
that facilitate food sovereignty;3 participatory democratic structures 
not measured solely by periodic elections but rather by how deeply 
engaged members of a community are in critical debate and 
decisions on their communal well-being;4 solidarity economies, 
made up of institutions centered on mutualism, like worker-owned 
cooperatives and community land trusts;5 non-exploitative 
community relationships to land divorced from conceptions of 
                                                            
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of 
Law. The author is grateful to the editors of the Pace International Law Review 
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1 BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 117 
(2014).  
2 Invest-Divest, THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, 
https://policy.m4bl.org/invest-divest/ (last visited May 19, 2019).  
3 Key Documents (Food Sovereignty), LA VIACAMPESINA, 
https://viacampesina.org/en/what-are-we-fighting-for/food-sovereignty-and-
trade/key-documents-food-sovereignty/ (last visited May 19, 2019)  
4 Kali Akuno, The Jackson Plan: A Struggle for Self-Determination, 
Participatory Democracy, and Economic Justice, ORGANIZING UPGRADE, (July 
16, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://archive.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/modules-
menu/black-organizing/item/539-the-jackson-plan.  
5 Id.  
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property;6 a world without gender or a gender binary;7 and much 
more.  
These are not newly evolved conceptions of freedom.  
Indigenous communities around the world have or had, in various 
ways, long practiced such freedom.  It was colonization that created 
oppressive constructs such as race; wealth and poverty; ownership 
of land; gender/gender binary; environmentally harmful means of 
food production; and our current understandings of policing and 
prisons.8  This is not to say that non-European societies knew 
nothing of relational power prior to colonization, but that the 
epistemology giving rise to these conceptions of freedom has long 
existed in various forms in many areas across the globe.  When we 
characterize them as “newly evolved” for the sake of defending 
existing legal norms that fail to capture these conceptions, we are 
valuing only the knowledge of imperialists. 
The internationally-recognized norm that should encompass 
these conceptions of freedom is that of self-determination.  As 
global social justice lawyers, it is this understanding of self-
                                                            
6 Julian Brave NoiseCat, The western idea of private property is flawed. 
Indigenous peoples have it right, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2017, 6:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/27/western-idea-private-
property-flawed-indigenous-peoples-have-it-right.  
7 Femifesto for Trans Liberation, TRANS DAY OF RESILIENCE (TDOR), 
https://www.tdor.co/femifesto (last visited Apr. 19, 2019), (“[c]reated by the 2016 
Trans Day of Resilience artists and organizers[.]”). 
8 See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and 
International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2007) (“[T]he imposition of 
colonial rule went hand in hand with the imposition of English rules of property, 
tort, and contract, which, in turn, facilitated the expansion of industrial and 
commercial capitalism in the East African Protectorate.”); Anibal Quijano, 
Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America, 1 NEPANTLA: VIEWS 
FROM THE SOUTH 533, 533 (2000) (“The racial axis has a colonial origin and 
character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in 
whose matrix it was established.”); María Lugones, Heterosexualism and the 
Colonial/Modern Gender System, 22 HYPATIA 186, 186 (2007) (“[Colonialism] 
introduced many genders and gender itself as a colonial concept and mode of 
organization of relations of production, property relations, of cosmologies and 
ways of knowing.”); Kevin F. Steinmetz, et al., Wicked Overseers: American 
Policing and Colonialism, 3 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 68, 70  (2017) (“Colonized 
populations are ‘re-educated’ into colonial society and, when resistance is given; 
institutions of formal social control, such as the police, ensure compliance through 
force and coercion.”).  
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determination that should be the North Star guiding our work.  Yet, 
paradoxically, we have long viewed the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (“UDHR” or “Declaration”)—a document that arises 
from, and validates, coloniality, the greatest obstacle to self-
determination – as our North Star instead.  As a result, we may have 
both reinforced the interests of imperial and settler-colonial powers 
and enervated our ability as lawyers to understand what freedom 
looks like outside of colonial structures, such as racial capitalism,9 
that undergird the modern global order.  The provisions of the 
UDHR should not serve as our goalposts, but as any other tool 
created by oppressors—to “creat[e] ideological and political 
cris[es]”10 serving to “destabilize” systems of oppression.11   
My point of critique of the UDHR is at three levels.  First, 
the UDHR forms part and parcel of a continuing imperialist system 
of international law.  Second, the context of the UDHR’s drafting 
demonstrates that its principal drafters were not interested in true 
self-determination of Third World12 peoples.  And third, the text 
itself serves to limit our visions of freedom by expressly affirming 
the foundational norms of racial capitalism. 
First, the UDHR cannot be understood outside of the broader 
colonial project of international law.  State sovereignty is a 
prerequisite to be an actor with full rights and responsibilities under 
international law.  Under the guise of this principle, international 
law has served to transform the non-European societies of the Third 
World to serve Western European and North American interests.  
                                                            
9 See generally CEDRIC ROBINSON, BLACK MARXISM: THE MAKING OF 
THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (1983).  
10 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331, 1386 (1988). 
11 Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals From 
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 410 (1987). 
12 Mutua explains: “The Third World is more truly a stream of similar 
historical experiences across virtually all non-European societies that has given 
rise to a particular voice, a form of intellectual and political consciousness. The 
term Third World is different from less-developed, crisis-prone, industrializing, 
developing, underdeveloped, or the South because it correctly captures the 
oppositional dialectic between the European and non-European, and identifies the 
plunder of the latter by the former. It places the state of crises of the world on the 
global order that the West has created and dominates.” Makau Mutua, What Is 
TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 31, 35 (2000) (emphasis omitted). 
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Essentially, European standards for society, which were racialized, 
gendered, and capitalist,13 were considered “universal.”14 
Accordingly, “the failure of non-[European] states to adhere to these 
standards denoted a lack of civilization” that both indicated their 
lack of legal personality under international law and “justified 
intervention and conquest” by European powers.15  In exercising 
their governance over colonized peoples, the colonizing powers 
established a “colonial state, one that was set up to serve, protect 
and advance the interests of imperial power and its entourage of 
corporations and banks” and that “had a monopoly over the use of 
violence,” through “police forces, armies and secret police” that 
“used force and, where necessary, violence, to protect the interests 
of the way in which capitalism operated in the peripheries.”16  
In the subsequent process of decolonization, former colonial 
powers sought to ensure that formal “political sovereignty” of their 
former colonies “could be created to be completely consistent with 
economic subordination.”17  Thus, the very design of colonial 
structures served to co-opt local leaders by aligning their interests 
with those of the former colonial powers and ensuring the continued 
flow of natural resources to those powers.18 Consequently, 
independence governments of the former colonies made only 
“modest reforms to the colonial state,” leaving the colonial 
structures of the state “fundamentally intact.”19  
In short, international law recognized political self-
determination solely within a “state”-based framework, and only 
that kind of “state” that maintained colonial structures that were 
designed to concentrate wealth with former colonizers and their co-
                                                            
13 See generally Quijano, supra note 8; Lugones, supra note 8.  
14 Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and 
Postcolonial Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 745 (2006). 
15 Id. 
16 Firoze Manji, Opinion, Why have there been so many despotic 
governments in Africa?, AL JAZEERA (July 29, 2014), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/despotic-governments-
africa-2014728125216648975.html. 
17 Anghie, supra note 14, at 747.  
18 Manji, supra note 16. See generally WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE 
UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1972). 
19 Manji, supra note 16.  
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opted local elite and use violence against those who resist these 
structures. 
Second, the context of the UDHR’s drafting shows that it 
was not meant to serve the emancipation of colonized peoples.  The 
Declaration was drafted in the late 1940s, in the midst of 
decolonization and domestic freedom struggles.  Anti-colonial 
struggles around the world, and the Black Freedom Movement in 
the United States,20 were clearly centered around the concept of self-
determination.  Yet, the UDHR makes no mention of the term.  
This omission was intentional.  As one scholar has observed, 
the Declaration’s drafters sought to ensure that the conception of 
“human rights” to be enshrined in the post-World War II global 
order “would be compatible with racial and imperial domination” 
by “describing human rights in such a way as to preclude the 
appearance . . . of colonialism and racial domination as themselves 
violations of human rights.”21  This decision to omit reference to 
“self-determination” coextensively served to reaffirm that to be 
“civilized,” or considered a legal actor in the international 
community, the state must confirm to a conception of human dignity 
held by its drafters, which included colonial powers and settler-
colonial states.  
One of the primary drafters of the UDHR, United States 
delegate Eleanor Roosevelt sought to create a document that would 
“position the United States as the moral leader of the free world, 
while the United States continued its amoral treatment of African 
Americans.”22 Another primary drafter, French delegate René 
Cassin, viewed human rights as “prior to true self-determination,” 
asserting that “the legitimacy of a state, its right to be treated as 
sovereign, rests on its respect for human rights.”23  Cassin’s 
understanding of the “respect for human rights” that would serve as 
                                                            
20 See generally BARBARA RANSBY, ELLA BAKER & THE BLACK 
FREEDOM MOVEMENT: A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC VISION (2003).  
21 Emma Stone Mackinnon, Declaration as Disavowal: Race and 
Empire in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 19, 20 (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.wpsanet.org/papers/docs/Mackinnon_WPSA_Paper.pdf.  
22 CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–1955, at 133 
(2003).  
23 Mackinnon, supra note 21, at 19–20.  
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a precondition for self-determination directly served imperialist 
interests.  This was evidenced by Cassin’s later defense of “France’s 
violent repression of the Algerian resistance . . . on the grounds that 
the resistance represented the enemies of human rights, who had 
sworn off respect for international law.”24  Under his view, 
“[c]olonial violence by France was not evidence of a lack of respect 
for rights, but was justified given the circumstances; anticolonial 
violence – by a colonized people fighting for their emancipation, in 
contrast, was evidence of a lack of respect for rights, and so proof 
of the lack of a legitimate claim to self-determination.”25  
This opposition to including reference to “self-
determination” was later overcome in the UDHR’s implementing 
Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, each of which expressly recognizes a right to self-
determination.  This was not, as many understand it, solely because 
the makeup of the United Nations changed through the process of 
decolonization.  It was also because European powers narrowed the 
conception of self-determination to formal political freedom from 
European imperial empires.26  Because decolonization was 
considered a process that had predominantly come to an end (in the 
manner described above) by the time the Covenants were drafted,27 
this conception of “self-determination” could pose little threat to 
continuing racial and economic subordination from which major 
powers such as Great Britain, France, and the United States 
benefited.   
                                                            
24 Id. at 21–22. 
25 Id. at 23.  
26 See, e.g., Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the 
Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the 
Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (2009) (“The idea of 
self-determination during this time was not that all peoples had a right to self-
determination but rather that all colonies had a right to be independent.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
27 For instance, “[b]y 1966, most of the African continent had gained 
independence.” Andrew W. M. Smith & Chris Jeppesen, Introduction: 
Development, Contingency and Entanglement: Decolonization in the 
Conditional, in BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE DECOLONIZATION OF AFRICA: 
FUTURE IMPERFECT? 1, 1 (2017).  
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Third, the text of the UDHR reinforces foundational norms 
of racial capitalism, created to serve imperialism and settler-
colonialism.  For instance, colonization was carried out by 
excluding indigenous peoples from the lands on which they lived  
and globally imposing European rules of property.28  Thus, by 
enshrining the right to property in Article 17, the UDHR served to 
maintain two fundamental features of colonization: the concept of 
property and the protection of ownership of land by European 
settlers in colonized territories.29   Similarly, the right to food is 
mentioned without elaboration in the Declaration’s Article 25.  This 
right was later defined in Article 11 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which focuses on 
increasing food production.  Yet, as the most recent global food 
crisis has demonstrated, inability to access food is not because of 
food scarcity but rather, the operations of international economic 
law (which itself reifies racial capitalism) that undermine food 
sovereignty.30  Finally, the UDHR recognizes rights that affirm the 
primary enforcement mechanisms of racial capitalism—policing 
and prisons—by articulating rights such as freedom from only 
“arbitrary” arrest and detention in Article 9.   
So, what does this mean for the work of global social justice 
lawyers? It cannot be denied that human rights language has served 
                                                            
28 Gathii, supra note 8, at 1014.  
29 See, e.g,, Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Colloquium at Centre for African 
Studies (July 7, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.anchoredinlaw.net/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/LAND-EQUALITY-AND-DIGNITY-Ntsebeza-
SC.pdf) (explaining that in the context of South African Constitution, upheld as 
prime example of the domestication of the UDHR,  “the entrenchment of the 
provisions of the 1913 Land Act in section 25(7) of the Constitution as a marker 
of a cut-off date for land restitution – or “restitution of that property”, to use the 
words in the section – provides a virtually insurmountable hurdle to any notion of 
restitution of land to indigenous owners thereof, owners of land who were 
dispossessed of their land, disproportionately unequally, by the very enactment of 
the 1913 Land Act”).  
30 See generally Carmen G. Gonzalez, International Economic Law and 
the Right to Food, in RETHINKING FOOD SYSTEMS: STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES, 
NEW STRATEGIES, AND THE LAW 165–193 (Nadia Lambek, et al., eds., 2014). 
Thanks to efforts led by the international peasant alliance La Via Campesina, in 
2018, the U.N. General Assembly recognized small farmers’ right to food 
sovereignty. G.A. Res. 73/165, Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and other 
People Working in Rural Areas, art. 15(4), U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/165 (2019). 
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as “both the legitimation of power and the praxis of emancipatory 
politics.”31   So how do we reconcile the two?  Perhaps through 
movement lawyering.  Movement lawyers view international human 
rights law merely as one set of tools, among many, to support 
community organizing (i.e., the building of collective      power) to 
resist systems of oppression standing in the way of          true self-
determination.  At the same time, movement lawyers work to 
develop a “radical imagination of law”32 beyond colonial constructs 
such as those offered by the UDHR, by co-struggling with oppressed 
communities and valuing their knowledge.33  By following the 
leadership of oppressed communities, movement lawyers seek to 
build another world where freedom—the type of freedom bell hooks 
describes—exists for all.  
 
 
                                                            
31 Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights, 8 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 126 (1998) (emphasis in original). 
Critical race theorists have articulated a similar “double consciousness” on  the 
use of “rights” language by communities of color in the United States. See, e.g., 
Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 1386; Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does 
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
301, 305 (1987); Williams, supra note 11, at 410.  
32 Amna A. Akbar, Toward A Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 405 (2018).  
33 See Amna Akbar, et al., Movement Visions for a Renewed 
Left Legalism, LAW & POL. ECON. (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://lpeblog.org/2019/03/05/movement-visions-for-a-renewed-left-legalism/.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/7
